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Abstract 
 
 The primary objective of this study is to examine the evidence of occurrences of extreme 
market pressure of currencies of a number of Asian economies against the US dollar during the 
period of 2000-2009. In particular, we are interested in investigating the severity of these 
pressures during the recent US sub-prime crisis of 2007-2009. Were the currencies of these 
economies subjected to indiscriminate selling pressures during the period of the crisis? Was the 
heightened severity of the selling pressures associated with a particular event during the sub-
prime crisis, such as the collapse of the Lehman-Brothers? Our findings confirm the globally 
indiscriminate impacts of the sub-prime crisis on the countries examined and the greatest impact 
was felt and experienced by these economies around the time of the Lehman-Brothers’ collapse 
during the last quarter of 2008. Our findings offer far-reaching implications in terms of the 
linkages between macroeconomic and financial stability. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Despite the uncertainties and the fear of another round of the financial crisis that occurred in 
1997 in Asia, the emerging markets of Asia have emerged relatively well from the recent sub-
prime global financial crisis. By the third and fourth quarter of 2009, the Asian economies in 
general, reported positive trade balances and net current account balances.  Signs that rapid 
economic recovery is on course can also be traced from their GDP growth rates. Moreover, the 
return of a continual inflow of portfolio capital starting in late 2009 confirmed the renewal of 
market confidence in the near term outlook of these Asian economies. Unprecedented fiscal and 
monetary policy stimulus packages in 2008 and early 2009 have contributed significantly to their 
rapid recoveries (Tables 1 and 2). The ability of the policy makers to maintain financial stability 
and prevent a severe credit crunch from taking place, has also given a major boost to their overall 
economic performances (Siregar and Lim (2010)).  
 
Among many aspects of a financial crisis, the sudden rise in exchange rate volatility has always 
been a major source of concern for policy makers. For instance, during the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, the large swings that involved severe depreciations of the local currencies exacerbated the 
fundamental weaknesses of the affected economies. The weak currencies forced many financial 
institutions and their clients into debilitating insolvencies (Lane (1999)). In tandem with the 
credit crunch, particularly sharp falls in trade credits, volatile local currencies were responsible 
for the collapse of the trade and other sectors of the economies in several major East and 
Southeast Asian economies such as Korea, Indonesia and Thailand during the 1997 crisis.  
 
The sub-prime crisis is no exception. The fear of another round of meltdowns of local currencies, 
which would then be followed by episodes of volatile swings in the rates, was particularly 
prevalent following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in last quarter of 2008. The past and recent 
economic and financial crises have underscored the role of exchange rate volatility as a key 
transmission channel of a financial sector meltdown to a wide spread slowdown in the real 
sector. The exchange rate volatility has also undermined the ability of monetary authorities and 
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central banks to manage price stability. Evidences based on their monetary policy reaction 
functions demonstrate that inflation-targeting economies around the globe, including those in 
Asia, has in fact, paid close attention to the volatilities of the local currencies before making 
necessary adjustments in their key policy rates (Aizenman, et.al. (2008) and Siregar and Goo 
(2010)).   
 
To manage the exchange rate volatility, central banks have often resorted to multiple policy 
instruments. Buying and selling foreign exchange reserves and policy rate adjustments are 
arguably two of the most frequently adopted instruments. Any excess demand for foreign 
exchange, responsible for the volatility, can be fulfilled through non-mutually exclusive 
conduits. If the market or currency pressure is successful, there will be a sharp depreciation of 
the domestic currency. However, at other times, the market pressure can be repelled or warded 
off through raising interest rates and/or running down on the foreign exchange reserves. 
Combining the information on exchange rate fluctuation, interest rate adjustment and reserve 
movement should convey a more informative and reasonable measure of the extent of pressures 
on a currency -  referred to as the index of exchange market pressure. This concept of exchange 
market pressure and its application have been elaborated in numerous studies, especially around 
the pre- and post-1997 Asian financial crisis (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (ERW) (1995, 
1996), Pozo and Dorantes (2003), and ADB (2005)).   
 
The primary objective of this study is to examine evidences of occurrences of extreme market 
pressure against the local currencies of a number of major Asian economies of the SEACEN 
group against the US dollar during the period of 2000-2009. In particular, we are interested to 
investigate the severity of these pressures during the recent sub-prime crisis of 2007-2009. Have 
the currencies of these economies been indiscriminately under selling pressure during the period 
of the recent global financial crisis? Has the height of the selling pressures been associated with a 
particular event during the recent sub-prime crisis, such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers?  
Lastly, are there lessons to be learned in light of our findings with regard to the supposed 
linkages between macroeconomic stability and financial stability, otherwise known as macro-
financial links?  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the basic construction of 
the EMP index as proposed by Eichengreen et al (1995, 1996). The extreme value theory and the 
Huisman et al (2001) estimator will be discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the constructed 
EMP index for the individual countries and some basic statistical properties of the EMP indices. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results of the implementation of the extreme value approach. 
Section 6 reports the episodes of extreme pressures against the local currencies of the Asian 
economies under study. Section 7  examines the close association of the Lehman-Brothers’ 
collapse to the identified episodes of extreme market pressures during the recent sub-prime 
crisis. Section 8 concludes the paper.        
 
2.  Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996) 
 
In this paper, we employ the exchange market pressure index adopted by Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (ERW) (1995, 1996) by taking a weighted average of the changes in exchange rates, 
international reserves and interest rates. This allows us to completely capture successful as well 
as unsuccessful currency pressures. More recent constructions of  indices such as by Kaminsky 
et al (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), while following the ERW (1995, 1996) very 
closely, however, excludes the interest rate differentials in their original construction of the 
indices. The exchange market pressure index of Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (ERW) (1995, 
1996) uses all three variables of the EMP index relative to a reference country. The US is used as 
our reference country. The EMP index using this method is expressed as: 
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country i in period t; t,USi  the nominal interest rate for the reference country (U.S.) in period t; 
iσ  the standard deviation of the nominal interest rate differential )( ,, tUSti ii − . 
As earlier emphasised, the EMP index increases with a depreciation of the domestic currency, a 
loss of international reserves and a rise in the domestic interest rate. A rise in the index reflects 
stronger selling pressure on the domestic currency. Similarly, when the index becomes negative, 
it signals rising buying pressure on the local economy. In addition, the breakdown of the EMP 
components may also reveal the policy preferences of the local central bank/monetary authority. 
Frequent adjustments in the interest rate or/and buying/selling of the foreign exchange reserves 
could be argued as evidences of ‘against (or with) the wind’ exchange rate policy of the local 
central bank.    
 
3.  Extreme Value Theory  
 
The conventional approach employed in the literature is that an extreme market pressure is 
identified when the EMP index exceeds some upper bound: 
Crisis = 

 +>
                       otherwise  0
  EMP if   1 EMPi,t µβσ EMP
 
where: σEMP equals the sample standard deviation of EMP index and µEMP is the sample mean of 
the EMP index. As noted, an extreme market pressure is identified if the EMP index crosses a 
threshold, defined in terms of an arbitrary multiple of standard deviations above the mean. The 
problem with this threshold is that it conveniently assumes that the EMP index is characterised 
by a well-behaved standard normal probability density function. However, the normality 
assumption is at odds with the substantial literature that characterises the statistical probability 
distribution function of financial asset returns, which describe such series as being fat-tailed. As 
an alternative, Pozo and Dorantes (2003), Lestano and Jacobs (2007) and Pontines (2010) 
suggest the use of the extreme value theory in exploiting information in the tails of the 
distribution by locating the threshold that separates the normal values of the EMP index 
(corresponds to normal periods) from that of extreme values of the index (corresponds to 
extreme pressure periods) without the need to set an arbitrary threshold value for the EMP index. 
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The estimation of the parameter (α), the tail index of the distribution of the EMP index, is crucial 
as it determines the degree of tail fatness the distribution exhibits. The tail index measures the 
speed at which the distribution’s tail approaches zerothe higher (α), the faster the speed and 
the less fat-tailed the distribution. In addition, the tail index (α) has the attractive feature that it is 
equal to the maximum number of existing finite moments in the distribution. Unfortunately, the 
estimation of the tail index is not a simple task, although there are a few available estimators in 
the literature. The most common of these is the Hill (1975) estimator, which is given as:  
            ∑
=
−−+−=
k
j
)kn(xln()jn(xln(
k
)k(
1
11γ                       (2) 
 
We assume that there is a sample of n positive independent observations drawn from some 
unknown fat-tailed distribution. Letting the parameter (γ) be the inverse of the tail index (α), and 
x( i ) be the i th-order statistic such that x( i – 1) ≤ x( i ) for i = 2,…, n. k is the pre-specified 
number of tail observations. The choice of k is crucial to obtain an unbiased estimate of the tail 
index. The intuition behind this critical choice of k is that there is an uncomfortable variance and 
bias trade-off. If we employ a k that is too low, we are not using all of the tail observations, and 
would thus obtain an estimate of the tail index with a large variance. In contrast, if we employ a 
k that is large, we bias the estimate of the tail index by including observations in the sample from 
the centre of the distribution.            
 
In an important paper, Huisman et al. (2001) introduces an estimator that overcomes the need to 
select a ‘single’ optimal k in small samples, by accounting for the bias in the Hill estimator. They 
showed that for values of k smaller than some threshold κ, the bias of the Hill estimate of γ 
increases almost linearly in k and can be approximated by: 
 
               )k(k)k( εββγ ++= 10 ,        k = 1,2, …, κ                    (3) 
  
The above equation has to be estimated by weighted least squares (WLS) to deal with the 
heteroscedasticity in the error term ε(k). The weight has ( 1 , 2 ,…, k ) as diagonal elements 
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and zeros elsewhere. The bias corrected estimate of γ is the intercept β0 and the estimate of the 
optimal tail index α would be given by αˆ = 1/β0. 
 
4.  Basic Trends and Statistical Properties of the EMP Indices 
The main sources of the data are the International Financial Statistics of the International 
Monetary Fund- and the CEIC database. We use monthly data for the period from January 1999 
to December 2009, covering twelve Asian countries, viz., Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), Hong Kong, Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Australia. With 
the exception of Australia, the rest of the economies included in our study are the SEACEN 
member countries.3 Australia, however, is one of the long standing partner countries of the 
SEACEN group. In the construction of the EMP index using the ERW method, the changes in 
reserves as well as the domestic policy rate, when available, are measured relative to the changes 
in reserves and the federal funds rate in the US, respectively. The key policy rates are reported in 
Table (3).   
  
Figures (1a-1c) illustrate the diverging volatility and severity of extreme market pressure in the 
individual SEACEN member countries.  A few observations are worth highlighting. Prior to 
2008, the Malaysian ringgit, the Thai baht, the Korean won, the New Taiwan dollar and the 
Singapore dollar had actually been under buying pressure for a couple of years or more. In 
contrast, the EMPs for Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Australia and Vietnam have, generally been in 
positive levels prior to 2008, suggesting that these countries’ currencies had experienced selling 
pressures. Nonetheless, it is clear that the year 2008 marked the period of heavy selling pressures 
for all the currencies of the countries in our study. Furthermore, the EMP series on average, 
peaked around the final quarter of 2008 ---about the period of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. 
                                               
3
 The South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre was established by a group of central 
banks and monetary authorities in 1982. Presently, the group has 16 members, namely Ministry of Finance, Brunei 
Darussalam, National Bank of Cambodia, Reserve Bank of Fiji, Bank Indonesia, The Bank of Korea, Bank Negara 
Malaysia, The Bank of Mongolia, Central Bank of Myanmar, Nepal Rastra Bank, Bank of Papua New Guinea, Bangko 
Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Central Bank of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan), Bank of Thailand and State Bank of Vietnam. 
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With the exception of Australia and Vietnam, the selling pressures have subsided markedly in 
2009.  
 
Examining the components of the EMP index for each country during 2008, it is apparent that 
the central banks of some countries, such as Indonesia, Korea and Sri Lanka, had to sell-off some 
of their foreign exchange reserves. Among these three economies, Korea had suffered the most 
substantial loss of its reserve of around US$42 billion from August 2008 to December 2008, or 
roughly about 21 percent of its reserves at the end of 2008. In addition, it is also apparent, with a 
possible exception of Hong Kong, the central banks/monetary authorities of these countries have, 
on average, kept their policy rates at increasingly higher spreads against that of the US federal 
funds rate during the final quarter of 2008 (Figures 2a-2c). Despite these efforts, the massive 
selling pressures during that final quarter of 2008, following the demise of Lehman Brothers, had 
eventually led to severe depreciations of these currencies. All of these Asian currencies had, on 
average, depreciated during that gloomy final quarter of 2008. The Indonesian rupiah and the 
Korean won depreciated the most at an average of 10 percent per month from September to 
November 2008. 
 
For the most part of 2009, the levels of EMP have declined across the countries, albeit remaining 
at a positive range, suggesting the selling pressures in the market had subsided or eased. From 
close observation of the components of the EMP index, it is apparent that most of the currencies 
included in this study have gained back some of the losses in their nominal values against the US 
dollar incurred in 2008, by second half of 2009. Similarly, the foreign exchange reserve position 
of these economies gradually increased, a reflection of the strengthening balance of payment 
position. However, the interest rate differentials remained positive for the most part, although 
they had declined sharply from the peaks of end 2008. With the exception of Australia, the 
central banks of these economies maintained soft monetary policy stances amidst concerns of 
fragile economic recoveries.  
  
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics for the EMP indices across the eleven SEACEN 
countries. The means and standard deviations diverge considerably across countries, and indicate 
that Sri Lanka and Vietnam suffered the largest market turbulence, whereas Hong Kong suffered 
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the smallest. Most of the series are skewed to the right and exhibit excess kurtosis which reflects 
fat-tailedness.4 These observations are most evident particularly in Taiwan and Vietnam.  These 
are further substantiated by the histogram of the EMP series for each of the eleven countries 
overlaid by its corresponding normal probability density functions in Figures 3a-3c. In all cases, 
it is obvious that the EMP indices depart significantly from the normal distribution – the mass of 
observation in the tails and the observed regularity of a great number of peak observations at the 
centre of the distribution. Thus, this brings into question the conventional approach of using the 
mean and standard deviation in forming thresholds to identify extreme market pressures. To deal 
with the non-normality of the series, the extreme value approach will be considered next.     
  
The Extreme Value Theory, in particular the Hill estimator, requires the use of stationary and 
uncorrelated data. Table 5 presents the combined results from the commonly used ADF unit-root 
test as well as from the alternative Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) unit-root 
test. The ADF procedure tests the null that the index of EMP has a unit root against the 
alternative of stationarity, whereas the KPSS procedure tests the null of stationarity against the 
alternative of unit root. In general, the EMP indices are I(0) variables at the 10 percent 
significance level or stronger according to the ADF test. In addition, confirmatory results from 
the KPSS unit-root test support the null hypothesis that, in general, the EMP indices are 
stationary.  
 
5.  Extreme Values 
  
In order to capture the tail mass or extreme values, the so-called tail index (α) has to be 
estimated, and as earlier mentioned, we use the Hill estimator for this purpose. The Hill estimator 
proceeds by ordering the values of the EMP index from lowest to highest denoted by x(i). 
Although asymptotically unbiased, the Hill estimator is biased in relatively small samples. In 
accordance with the suggestion of Huisman et al. (2001), to deal with the estimation of the tail 
                                               
4
 Excess with respect to the normal distribution which has a kurtosis equal to 3. 
11 
 
index with a small sample size,5 we use Equation (3) in estimating a weighted least squares 
(WLS) regression for the EMP index for each individual country, after computing the γ (inverse 
of α) for a range of values of k. The essence is to identify the ‘extreme right-tail’ observations 
from an ordered distribution of the EMP index as the number and incidence of extreme market 
pressure episodes that individual countries experienced are determined in the right-tail 
distribution. Accordingly, Diebold, Schuermann and Stroughhair (2000) suggested, (also 
similarly employed by Pozo and Dorantes (2003) and Lestano and Jacobs (2007)), that recursive 
residuals be derived from the weighted least squares regression to diagnose structural changes, 
which will guide us in the selection of the optimal k.       
 
Figures 4a-4c show the recursive residuals for individual countries and these are plotted against 
the bandwidth of plus and minus two standard errors. When we consider the empirical 
distribution of the EMP indices, the apparent break around the right-hand side of the plots of the 
recursive residuals appropriately correspond to the optimal choice of k, or equivalently, the 
number of ‘extreme right-tail’ observations have now been identified. For example, the recursive 
residual in the case of Indonesia crosses the confidence band at the 11thlargest observation, such 
that the optimal k in this case is 11.  
 
Table 6 lists the optimal values of k as well as the values of ( αˆ ). The extreme market pressure 
episodes are then identified from these optimal values of k. The next section will discuss these 
results in detail. The estimates of the tail index (α) range from 1.70 to 9.79 for the case of 
Singapore and Hong Kong, respectively.6  The foregoing estimates of the tail index suggests that 
the statistical distribution that can adequately capture the observed distribution of the EMP 
values is the Student’s t-distribution as nine of the twelve countries reported tail index estimates 
that are above 2. 
 
                                               
5
 It should be noted that we are dealing with a small sample as the entire sample period only covers at most 126 
months.       
6
 As a point of comparison, Huisman et al. (2002) obtained tail index estimates that are between 3 and 8 for 
different exchange rates. Likewise, Pontines (2010) obtained tail index estimates of OECD house prices that are 
between 3 and 9. 
12 
 
 
6. Episodes and Incidence of Extreme Market Pressures 
 
Based on the optimal values of k reported in Table 6, a six-month exclusion window is then 
adopted to derive the number of extreme market pressure episodes.7 This window is adopted to 
avoid counting the same market pressure more than once especially since a market pressure often 
lasts for over a month and more market pressure occurs in successive months. Table 7 reports the 
extreme market pressure episodes and the rate of incidence of extreme market pressures 
experienced in all twelve SEACEN member countries. The incidence rate is the percentage of 
the ratio of the number of extreme market pressure episodes over the total number of EMP 
observations.  
      
Table 8 lists the actual chronological dates of extreme market pressure episodes identified by the 
extreme value approach. The Table shows that the extreme value approach is able to pick-up the 
adverse impact of the global financial crisis of 2008-09 in almost all countries with the exception 
of Hong Kong. This result is consistent with the widely acknowledged possibility of contagion of 
crisis across countries. In addition to the global financial crisis, the extreme value approach is 
able to capture the effect of the information technology (IT) sector slump in the US in early 2000 
to mid-2001, the collapse in 2001 of Argentina’s convertibility plan as well as some of the 
domestic political uncertainties in Indonesia in the aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian Crisis until 
mid-2002 and the late-2000 impeachment of former President Joseph Estrada in the Philippines.  
 
7.  The Extreme Pressures of the Lehman-Brothers and Macro-Financial Links 
 
Our findings confirm the indiscriminate impacts of the recent sub-prime crisis on our Asian 
currencies (Tables 7 and 8). With the exception of Hong Kong, the currencies of these Asian 
economies began to suffer extreme selling pressures only in second quarter of 2008. The Hong 
Kong dollar, on the other hand, was already under heavy selling pressure since the early stage of 
                                               
7
  Note that ERW (1996) employed a six-month exclusion window.  
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the sub-prime crisis in late 2006 and early 2007.  A number of banks and financial institutions in 
the US and Europe had reported massive losses starting 2006.  
 
Nonetheless, it is clear from our test results that the significant shock to our Asian currencies was 
only fully felt around the period of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008. The stock 
market indices of the major Asian economies included in the study dropped on average, by about 
22 percent between September and October 2008. Undoubtedly, the stock market of Vietnam 
endured the most volatile and drastic collapse among the SEG economies. The fast growing 
economy, privatisation of state-owned companies, and liberalisation measures that allowed 
foreigners to hold up to 49% of public companies, catapulted the stock exchange index of 
Vietnam to more than double between the last quarter of 2006 and first quarter of 2007. 
However, by the end of first quarter of 2009, the index had plummeted back to the level of 
January 2006. 
 
Tightening of the interbank markets across Asia was reported, and the fear of bank-runs forced 
central banks around the region to either expand the size of their deposit guarantees or to adopt a 
full blanket guarantee, such as in the case of Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. In 
addition, various regulations on capital flows have been implemented. In Indonesia for instance, 
Bank Indonesia, issued a regulation whereby any transfer of cash to banks outside of the country 
amounting to US$100,000 or more, requires to be reported to the central bank on the motive and 
reason for the transfer. 
 
The crisis which highlighted the close linkage and deep-rooted integration of the local banking 
sector to that of the global financial system was another wake-up call for regulators and 
supervisors of financial institutions around the world and more specifically in Asia, for the 
urgent need to strengthen their capacities.  The adverse shock in the global financial system was 
transmitted to the local economy by several channels. We have seen the deterioration of the 
global financial market had adversely affected the balance sheet of local financial institutions in 
Asia, and raised the perceived risk premium. This condition triggered credit rationing and 
resulted in further deterioration in bank lending, investment and economic growth in some parts 
of Asia, especially from the last quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009. The strong links 
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from balance sheet deterioration to the slowdown in the economic growth have been often 
underlined as one portion of the macro-financial linkages (Bayoumi and Melander (2008)).   
 
A more obvious presence of macro-financial linkages can be traced from the sharp fall in the 
exports of many economies globally, including Asia, during the peak of the sub-prime crisis.  
The global financial slowdown weakened the demand of developed economies, in particular, for 
export products of Asian economies, at the rate that was worse than during the 1997 financial 
crisis (Table 9). The weak purchasing power was very rapidly translated into sharp falls in 
demand for exports of major Asian economies (Siregar (2010)). In addition to weak purchasing 
power, the increase in exchange rate volatilities following massive losses experienced by major 
financial institutions, especially during the height of economic and financial crises, had also been 
blamed for weak demand for export products (Rahmatsyah, et.al. (2002), Siregar and Rajan 
(2004) and Ronci (2005)).    
 
8.  Brief Concluding Remarks 
  
Exchange rate volatility has long been touted as one of the key features of economic and 
financial crisis around the globe. In their recent work, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) demonstrated 
that the recent US sub-prime financial crisis is hardly unique, and like past economic and 
financial crisis of the past eight centuries, the recent sub-prime crisis was accompanied by 
exchange rate crashes. During the 1997 financial meltdown in East Asia, the volatile local 
exchange rates were partly blamed for the severity of the crisis, particularly on the tradable 
sectors. Therefore, studies have been undertaken to capture and measure the presence and the 
extensiveness of pressures, especially selling pressures, on the foreign exchange markets. 
  
Our study constructs the exchange market pressure index and investigates the presence of 
extreme market pressures for twelve SEACEN economies during the past decade. Instead of the 
frequently applied mean and standard deviation criteria, the application of the extreme value 
theory has been adopted in this study to estimate the thresholds of the extreme selling points. The 
results are conclusive across the economies under study. Despite of the strength of the local 
financial institutions in the years leading up to the crisis, the currencies of these economies have 
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been hit hard nonetheless. In addition, we find that the major blow came specifically around the 
period of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. This chain of events underscores the global scale of the 
recent sub-prime crisis and the globalised nature of the financial markets around the world, 
including those in Asia. This exposure to external shocks has not only complicated the recovery 
efforts, but will likely pose challenges for the conduct of macroeconomic policies in these Asian 
economies in the near future. 
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Table 1: Fiscal Stimulus Packages in Selected SEACEN Countries 
 
Korea 
Fiscal expenditure and tax cuts 
under “2009 Budget and 
Public Fund Operations Plan to 
Overcome Economic 
Difficulties” 
(KRW 35.6 trillion, 
USD 26 billion, 
4% of GDP) 
- Creation of more jobs by providing better job training through expansion of the 
internship system, vitalising venture enterprises, increased job positions for the 
underprivileged  
- Increase welfare support to stabilise livelihoods of low-income classes and provide 
aggressive support in reducing childcare costs  
- Increase social overhead capital investment with focus on investments in construction 
projects including leading projects for advancement of the metropolitan economy and 
provincial traffic network expansion  
- Support stabilisation of SMEs and the financial markets by increasing SME guarantees  
- Support regional finances to offset reduced real estate tax  
Dec 13, 
2008  
Fiscal expenditure under 
“Green New Deal Job Creation 
Plan”  
- measure expected to generate 
950,000 jobs over 4 years 
(consolidation of previous 
plans)  
(KRW 50 trillion,  
USD 37 billion)  
- Energy conservation, recycling and clean energy development to build an energy-saving 
economy  
- Green transportation networks and clean water supplies to upgrade the quality of life and 
environment  
- Carbon reduction and stable supply of water resources to protect the earth and future 
generations  
- Building of industrial and information infrastructure and technology development to use 
energy efficient in the future 
Jan 
2009  
20 
 
Fiscal expenditure (supplementary 
budget bill)  
KRW 29 trillion 
-Maintaining job security and revitalizing provincial economies & supporting industries 
with future growth potential (17 trillion Won)  
- Remaining amounts to plug tax revenue shortfalls  
 
Mar 
2009 
Indonesia  
Fiscal expenditure and tax cuts  
(IDR 73.3 trillion  
USD 6.7 billion  
1.4% of GDP)  
- General income tax cut (43 trillion)  
- Government borne-tax and import duties (13.3 trillion)  
- Infrastructure spending (9.7 trillion)  
- Energy subsidy and financing for the support of small business activities (7.3 trillion)  
Jan 
2009  
Second stimulus spending  
(IDR 61.2 trillion  
USD 6 billion) (2010)  
- Poverty reduction  
- Infrastructure spending  
- Education and health development  
Aug 
2009  
Fiscal expenditure  
(MYR 7 billion,  
USD 1.9 billion  
1% of GDP)  
- Investment funds to promote strategic industries and high-speed broadband (1.9 billion)  
- Small-scale infrastructure projects (1.6 billion)  
- Education and skills training programmes (1 billion)  
- Public transport and military facilities (1 billion)  
Nov 
2008  
Fiscal expenditure  
(MYR 60 billion,  
USD 16.2 billion  
9% of GDP)  
- Fiscal injection (15 billion)  
- Equity investment (10 billion)  
- Tax incentives (3 billion)  
- Guarantee funds (25 billion)  
- Private finance initiatives and off-budget projects (7 billion) 
 
Mar 
2009  
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Malaysia 
Fiscal expenditure  
(MYR 7 billion,  
USD 1.9 billion  
1% of GDP)  
- Investment funds to promote strategic industries and high-speed broadband (1.9 billion)  
- Small-scale infrastructure projects (1.6 billion)  
- Education and skills training programmes (1 billion)  
- Public transport and military facilities (1 billion)  
Nov 
2008  
Fiscal expenditure  
(MYR 60 billion,  
USD 16.2 billion  
9% of GDP)  
- Fiscal injection (15 billion)  
- Equity investment (10 billion)  
- Tax incentives (3 billion)  
- Guarantee funds (25 billion)  
- Private finance initiatives and off-budget projects (7 billion) 
 
Mar 
2009  
Philippines 
Fiscal expenditure and tax cuts  
(PHP 330 billion,  
USD 6.5 billion,  
4.6% of GDP)  
- Job creation programme expected to provide 824,000 temporary jobs at government 
departments by July 2009  
- Tax reduction in corporate income tax and waiver of personal income tax for minimum 
wage earners  
- Infrastructure projects  
- Waiver of penalties on loans from social security institutions  
 
Jan 
2009  
Singapore 
Fiscal expenditure and tax cuts  
(SGD 20.5 billion,  
- “Job Credit Programme”; cash transfers for employers to cover part of their wage bills 
and avoid massive lay-offs  
Jan 22, 
2009  
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USD 13.7 billion,  
8% of GDP)  
- “Special Risk Sharing Initiative”; government guarantees working capital loans to 
individual firms to stimulate bank lending  
- Tax cuts; corporate tax rate from 18% to 17% and personal income tax rebates of 20% 
of taxes due. 
 
Sri Lanka 
Package to support export 
sectors (LKR 16 billion USD 
141 million 0.3 % of GDP 
-Incentives for the agricultural and industrial export sectors (tea, textiles, tourism, leather, 
rubber) 
-Reduction in fuel prices 
-Waiver on 15% electricity surcharge 
 
Dec 30, 
2008 
Thailand 
Supplementary budget  
(THB 116.7 billion,  
USD 3.3 billion,  
1.3% of GDP)  
- One time living cost allowance of THB 2000 for those earning < THB 15,000 per month  
- Extension of 5 public service subsidies programmes for 6 months  
- Support given to unemployed workers  
- Free education for students  
- “Sufficient Economy Fund for Improvement in Quality of Life” fund for rural villages  
- Old-age support payment of THB 500 per month  
- Infrastructure projects  
- Tax measures to boost real estate sector, SMEs and the tourism industry 
Jan 
2009  
Thai Khem Khang (or Thai 
Strength)  
-Infrastructure investment in mass transit; transportation and communication; energy; 
education; healthcare; housing; water resources  
Jun 
2009  
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(THB 1.43 trillion, USD 42 
billion)  
(2010-2012)  
 
 
 
Vietnam 
Fiscal expenditure  
(VND 17 trillion,  
USD 1 billion,  
1.1% of GDP)  
- 4% interest subsidy on loans to SMEs  
- Reduction in corporate income tax for SMEs  
- Exemption on personal income tax from Jan to May 2009 
 
Dec 
2008  
Fiscal expenditure  
(VND 300 trillion,  
USD 17.6 billion,  
21% of GDP)  
- Infrastructure projects  
- Measures to support manufacturing and export sectors  
- Projects designed to support social security and welfare  
 
Mar 
2009  
 
 
Source: ESCAP (2009) 
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Table 2:A Summary of Selected Central Banks’ Main Policy Responses to the Crisis 
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DOMESTIC FINANCIAL 
POLICIES 
         
        Deposit Guarantee ● ● ● ● ● ●1/ ● ● ● 
       Government Stake in   
Banks 
 ●        
       Regulatory Forbearance          
      and Surveillance 
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
          
MONETARY POLICY          
       Policy Rate ● ● ● ●  ● ● ● ● 
       Reserve Ratio ●  ● ●  ● ●  ● 
       Liquidity Intervention ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
          
OTHERS          
       Exchange Rate Management ● ●  ● ● ● ●  ● 
       International Swap   
       Agreements 3/ 
● ● ● ● ●   ● ● 
Notes: 
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1/ New scheme to be introduced in 2010.  
2 /Increase in policy rate due to inflationary concerns. 
3/ ASEAN+3 (Japan, China and Korea) nations have officially signed an agreement to set up a US$120 billion currency swap fund 
under the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). CMIM is to be launched on 24 March 2010 (Bank of Japan website). 
 
Sources: Siregar and Lim (2010) 
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Table 3: Key Interest Rates 
 
Country Interest Rate 
Australia Cash Rate 
Hong Kong Window Discount Base Rate 
Indonesia BI-rate* 
Korea Base Rate 
Malaysia Overnight Policy Rate 
Philippines Overnight Reverse Repo Rate 
Singapore 3-month Interbank Rate 
Sri Lanka Central Bank Reverse Repo Rate 
Taiwan Discount Rate 
Thailand Repurchase Rate 
Vietnam Prime Lending Rate 
US Federal Funds Rate 
*/ BI-rate is only available starting M 2005. Prior to that the SBI-1 month rate was the primary 
policy rate of Bank Indonesia. 
Source: CEIC database 
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Table 4: Some Basic Descriptive Statistics of the EMP Index 
 
 Mean St. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Australia 1.173 1.807 0.596 4.542 
Hong Kong 3.502 1.586 -0.008 6.543 
Indonesia 1.680 1.691 1.394 8.062 
Korea 0.539 1.939 2.080 10.982 
Malaysia -0.114 1.831 2.079 13.192 
Philippines 2.729 1.967 1.076 7.866 
Singapore -1.174 1.825 2.293 16.452 
Sri Lanka 3.322 1.976 1.232 7.097 
Taiwan -0.466 1.747 2.360                      16.730 
Thailand -0.427 1.668 2.253 16.712 
Vietnam 2.794 2.059 2.232 11.001 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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Table 5: Unit Root Tests 
 
EMP index 
ADF test  
without trend 
ADF test  
with trend 
KPSS test  
without trend 
KPSS test  
with trend  
Australia -7.26*** -7.92*** 0.33 0.08 
Hong Kong -8.16*** -9.04*** 0.36* 0.14* 
Indonesia -9.10*** -9.41*** 0.33 0.11 
Korea -3.15** -3.29* 0.34 0.14* 
Malaysia -2.91** -3.23* 0.33 0.14* 
Philippines -4.28*** -4.61*** 0.24 0.09 
Singapore -3.51*** -3.87** 0.26 0.09 
Sri Lanka -3.80*** -3.83** 0.13 0.11 
Taiwan -4.51*** -6.74*** 0.15 0.10 
Thailand -7.28*** -7.66*** 0.24 0.09 
Vietnam -5.08*** -5.19*** 0.16 0.12* 
     
*     indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 10 percent. 
**   indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 5 percent. 
***  indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1 percent. 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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Table 6: Corresponding Parameter Estimates 
 
EMP index k γˆ
 
αˆ
 
    
Australia 4 0.30 3.35 
Hong Kong 16 0.10 9.79 
Indonesia 11 0.30 3.28 
Korea 9 0.42 2.37 
Malaysia 6 0.50 2.00 
Philippines 18 0.17 5.97 
Singapore 7 0.59 1.70 
Sri Lanka 12 0.22 4.45 
Taiwan 8 0.48 2.07 
Thailand 6 0.57 1.75 
Vietnam 
 
14 0.27 3.76 
    
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
 
 
30 
 
Table 7: Episodes and Incidences of Extreme Market Pressures 
 
Country Number of Episodes* Rate  of Incidences** 
 
 
Australia 
1 0.75 
 
Hong Kong 
7 5.30 
 
Indonesia 
5 3.79 
 
Korea 
3 2.33 
 
Malaysia 
2 1.52 
 
Philippines 
7 5.30 
 
Singapore 
2 1.52 
 
Sri Lanka 
4 3.28 
 
Taiwan 
2 1.52 
 
Thailand 
2 1.71 
 
Vietnam 
5 4.72 
 
*/ Market pressure episodes are based on 6-month exclusion window. That is an episode of 
pressure is reported when we have 6-consecutive months of extreme pressures. **/Incidence is 
calculated by dividing the number of episodes with the number of observation (in %). 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Table 8: Dates of Crises* 
 
Country Dates 
 
Australia August 2008 
 
Hong Kong 
January 2000, June 2002, October 2003, 
January 2005, June 2006, January 2007, 
November 2007 
 
Indonesia 
February 1999, September 1999, September 
2000, April 2001, October 2008 
Korea March 2003, March 2008, October 2008  
Malaysia May 2008 and January 2009 
 
Philippines 
May 2000, December 2000, July 2001, June 
2002, February 2003, September 2003, and 
October 2008. 
Singapore September 2001 and August 2008 
 
Sri Lanka 
June 2000, January 2001, March 2002 and  
November 2008 
Taiwan May 2001 and August 2008 
Thailand September 2002 and May 2008 
 
Vietnam 
June 2001, June 2002, May 2008, December 
2008 and July 2009 
 
 
*/ These dates are starting dates of the 6 month exclusion window. For instance, August 2008 
suggests that the next 6 month starting August 2008, the local currency is facing an extreme 
selling pressure. 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
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Table 9: The Tales of Exports’ Contractions During Two Crises* 
 
 The 1997 Financial crisis The Sub-prime Crisis 
 
Indonesia 
 
-27% 
(Quarter 3, 1997- 
Quarter 1, 1999) 
 
-38% 
(Quarter 3, 2008- 
Quarter 1, 2009) 
 
Korea 
 
 
-17% 
(Quarter 4, 1997- 
Quarter 3, 1998) 
 
-35% 
(Quarter 3, 2008 – 
Quarter 1, 2009) 
 
Thailand 
 
 
-11% 
(Quarter 4, 1997- 
Quarter 2, 1998) 
 
-31% 
(Quarter 3, 2008- 
Quarter 1, 2009) 
 
*/ Note: we limit our observation period to 8 quarters span following the peak amount prior to 
the outbreak of the crisis. 
 
Source: CEIC database, the websites of Bank Indonesia, Bank of Korea and Bank of Thailand, 
and the author’s own calculation. 
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Figure 1a: Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) Index 
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Source: Authors’ own calculation 
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Figure 1b: Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) Index 
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Source: Authors’ own calculation. 
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Figure 1c: Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) Index 
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Source: Authors’ own calculation 
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Figure 2a: Policy Rate Differentials with the US Federal Funds Rate 
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Source: Authors’ own calculation 
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Figure 2b: Policy Rate Differentials with the US Federal Funds Rate 
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Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 2c: Policy Rate Differentials with the US Federal Funds Rate 
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Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Figure 3a: Normal Density Distribution 
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Figure 3a (cont’d) 
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Figure 3b: Normal Density Distribution 
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Figure 3b (cont’d) 
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Figure 3c: Normal Density Distribution 
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Figure 3c (cont’d) 
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Figure 4a: Recursive Residuals 
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Note: Vertical Axis: recursive residuals (bold line) and ± two standard errors (dash lines). Horizontal axis: number of observations 
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Figure 4b: Recursive Residual 
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Note: Vertical Axis: recursive residuals (bold line) and ± two standard errors (dash lines). Horizontal axis: number of observations 
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Figure 4c: Recursive Residual 
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Note: Vertical Axis: recursive residuals (bold line) and ± two standard errors (dash lines). Horizontal axis: number of observations 
